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Voucher programs are intended to raise
the academic achievement of students,
but, unfortunately, so far the evidence
suggests that Cleveland’s voucher stu-
dents perform no better than their
counterparts in public schools.
V ouchers for K–12 education 
continue to attract interest, offering the
promise of greater parental choice,
enhanced school efficiency, and
improved educational outcomes for 
students. The first formal voucher 
program was established in Milwaukee
in 1990, and its practical success was 
followed by programs in Cleveland,
Florida, Colorado, and Washington,
D.C. With these programs has come sus-
tained inquiry into vouchers and their
anticipated effects. Here we review the 
evidence that has accumulated so far
about voucher programs in general, 
and then we take a closer look at the
Cleveland Scholarship Program (CSP)
in particular, including its effects on 
student test scores. 
Ohio plans on introducing a CSP-like
program in 2006 at the lowest-perform-
ing schools across the state. Evidence on
the efficacy of the CSP program is there-
fore critical, both for the direct develop-
ment of policy in Ohio and for voucher
initiatives in other states.
■ Research to Date on Vouchers 
Voucher programs are expected to raise
students’academic achievement, and the
most high-profile research on vouchers
has looked at whether they do. The evi-
dence shows, at best, moderate advan-
tages for voucher participants. 
For the Milwaukee Program, Rouse
(1998) found small but positive effect-
size differences for math but no effect
for reading. However, the data were
from the first five years of the program;
religious schools were not participating,
and the voucher students were concen-
trated in a few schools. For the Florida
program, Figlio and Rouse (2005) found
modest results from data on over
180,000 students. Voucher users in 
initially low-performing schools do post
higher test scores, but much of this is
attributable either to student characteris-
tics (that is, the users were self-selected,
high-ability students) or teaching to the
high-stakes test (suggesting that the
achievement gains may not have been
genuine cognitive gains). 
Randomized field trials for vouchers in
three cities found small test score gains
after three years (Howell and Peterson,
2002). These treatment effects were 
primarily for African Americans in one
setting, with no evidence of cumulative
gains for those who used the voucher for
the longest periods. Finally, it is worth
noting that new evidence from expanded
public school choice points to the same
conclusion, with few achievement gains
from placement in a choice school
(Cullen et al., 2005). 
Other studies have investigated broader
questions, such as: How do parents
choose schools when vouchers are avail-
able to them? In what ways are private
schools accessed by voucher students
better than public schools? How do
vouchers influence public finances? 
In looking at school-choice decisions by
parents, it is clear that many affluent
families already have choices; attention
therefore focuses on how voucher pro-
grams might open up choices for those
families that are constrained. Thus far,
all voucher programs have been targeted
to low-income families or to districts
with low-performing schools. Clearly,
vouchers expand the choices of low-
income families. 
However, several mediating factors mean
that voucher programs are less effective
in promoting choice among low-income
families than is implicit in a simple read-
ing of the program eligibility rules. First,
religion pervades family preferences 
of schools (Campbell et al., 2005). Cer-
tainly, parents value high test scores, but
preferences are varied, and many fami-
lies choose their neighborhood school. 
Second, race has a strong influence on
people’s choice of school. The relation-
ship is complicated by different patterns
across Hispanic and African American
children and by the fact that public
schools show strong patterns of racial
segregation. However, vouchers consis-
tently lead to greater student segregation
(even in a highly minority public school
system such as Washington, D.C.). 
Third, school choice is an action—it
requires that parents actually make use
of the voucher to change schools. Usage
rates are much lower—perhaps by one-
third—than offer rates (Howell and
Peterson, 2002, table 2-2). Moreover,
even within low-income groups, the
children most likely to use the voucher
are those who are the most motivated.
Also, a nontrivial proportion of those
who receive vouchers are already in pri-
vate school. Thus, it is an overstatementto declare that vouchers significantly
help the disadvantaged. 
Research has also investigated the 
supply of private schooling. Without
supply, family preferences become
meaningless—and if private schools 
do not operate in ways distinct from
public schools, there will be no advan-
tage to students from choosing them. 
Again, several consistent findings
emerge. Most participating schools are
religious (across various faiths); secular
schools have a small market share. The
supply of new schools appears reason-
ably elastic: For example, almost 
one-half of schools participating in the
Milwaukee program were founded after
it was introduced. And voucher-student
enrollees are increasingly a majority
within their school: by 2001, 40 percent
of the schools participating in the 
Milwaukee program had more than 
80 percent of their students claiming
vouchers. So voucher programs attract
new private schools rather than extra
places in existing private schools. 
However, research on the inputs and
technologies that private schools use
(beyond selecting their students) and
which are more efficient has yielded
very little: Economists are still no fur-
ther ahead in identifying the separate
benefits of ownership, innovation, and
technical efficiency; that is, they are no
further ahead in knowing which inputs
work best (Hanushek, 2004). After con-
trolling for student characteristics, most
research finds only very modest advan-
tages to private school. 
Finally, greater competition is likely to
improve schools’performance (Belfield
and Levin, 2002), but the competitive
pressures exerted by small-scale voucher
programs are likely to be very modest. 
Other research has examined how
voucher programs might impinge on the
existing public school system and its
local financing. Because schooling is
financed locally, individual school
choices will feed back into house prices,
district spending, and so school quality. 
Thomas Nechyba found several novel
results in a study he conducted in 2003,
in which he modeled the introduction 
of large-scale voucher programs and
examined the effects on public school-
ing and finance. First, competition for
high-ability students would increase;
these students would pay lower tuitions,
both as a result of the voucher and as a
consequence of schools’greater eager-
ness to enroll them. Second, public
schools would engage in more ability
tracking to prevent high-ability students
from switching to private school. Both
factors suggest further educational
inequalities, with greater rewards (and
resources) for high-ability students.
Third, public school quality is most
likely to decline in middle or high
income school districts. 
Importantly, opinions about vouchers are
likely to be driven by perceived effects
on property values than on educational
outcomes; homeowners may be wary 
of education reforms that may raise
uncertainty as to the value of their home. 
■ The Cleveland Scholarship
Program
The Cleveland Scholarship Program
operates in the Cleveland Municipal
Schools District (CMSD), which has
75,000 students across 130 schools
(2005–2006). Eligible schools are non-
public chartered schools located within
the CMSD and approved by the state
superintendent. Surrounding public
school districts are eligible to apply. 
Currently 5,734 students participate. 
Initially, eligible children had to be
entering a grade between kindergarten
and eighth grade, reside within the
CMSD, and require no segregated spe-
cial education. Low-income families
were given preference, with those below
200 percent of the poverty level provided
with 90 percent of tuition or $2,250,
whichever was lower. Families above
200 percent of the poverty level were
provided with 75 percent of tuition or
$1,875, whichever was lower.  About
one-quarter of students came from the
latter group. In the first year of operation
(1996), enrollment was 1,996, with total
funding of $5 million (with transport
paid by the CMSD). 
In comparison, per-pupil expenditure 
in the CMSD in 1996 was $6,675
(excluding transport). In 2003–04, the
scholarships were made available for
ninth grade and beyond. Funding was
increased to $3,000 for grades kinder-
garten through eight and set at $2,700
for higher grades. Where voucher appli-
cations exceeded available placements, a
lottery system was used. 
Despite its usefulness for informing
future voucher reforms, the CSP has
been the subject of little academic
inquiry. The program is sufficiently
large to allow for samples of students
according to voucher status and reli-
gious schooling, and with recent data, 
it offers an up-to-date evaluation of
vouchers in light of recent school-choice
reforms. Given the duration of the 
program, it is possible to examine the
question of whether persistence in the
program yields higher rewards. Impor-
tantly, the CSP voucher is relatively
ungenerous: If effects can be found for
this program, it is likely that achieve-
ment gains would be even larger for 
programs which are more generous. 
Students were classified according to
voucher status so that effects could be
identified: Users (offered a voucher and
used it to attend private school); non-
users (offered a voucher but did not use
it or stopped using it); applicant rejects
(applied for a voucher but not offered
one); eligibles (eligible to receive a
voucher but did not apply for one); and
ineligibles (did not apply and were not
eligible according to the program rules). 
When studying the achievement data in
places where voucher programs are in
place, various biases could make identi-
fying the effects that are due just to
vouchers more difficult. Three biases are
particularly important, but their effects
are (probably) offsetting for this program.
Applicant bias occurs where only those
who apply for the voucher are likely 
to benefit from it. This will bias gains
toward users, because applicants are
typically motivated families. Eligibility
bias occurs where those who are eligible
differ both from those who apply and
(separately) from those who do not
apply. This will bias gains away from
users, because CSP eligibility is condi-
tional on low family income. (It is possi-
ble with these data to control for eligi-
bility). Usage bias occurs as those who
use the voucher differ from those who
do not use it, conditional on application
and eligibility. This will bias gains in
favor of users relative to nonusers
because usage is positively correlated
with ability and family resources. In
addition, data collection inevitably 
generates some response bias as survey
attrition rates are higher for nonusers. 
■ Evaluating the CSP
Since 1996, the CSP has been evaluated
by the Center for Education Evaluation at
Indiana University (see Metcalf et al.,
2003). The center began collecting data
for students entering kindergarten in1997 and has continued until they were
in the sixth grade in 2003. (No substan-
tive changes in program design occurred
during this period, but the legal status of
the program was resolved only in 2002).
The dataset includes over 4,000 students
who attend over 100 separate schools. 
In terms of voucher status, the dataset is
composed of users (23 percent),
nonusers (10 percent), applicant rejects
(16 percent), and a public school com-
parison group (51 percent). 
The dataset has three advantages: It is
longitudinal (including achievement
measures); it includes students from
multiple comparison groups; and it is 
a large sample spread across many 
different schools. However, because the
data do not allow us to distinguish 
eligibles from ineligibles, both of these
are included in the public school 
comparison group. Also, the sample
sizes are considerably lower with 
attrition and missing responses. 
Evidence on the CSP comports with
extant research. Specifically, most stu-
dents chose religious schools, and high
(and growing) proportions of voucher
applicants and users had previously
been enrolled in private school. Student
characteristics across voucher status are
similar to those in other studies. African
American students and low-income 
students are much less likely to use the
voucher, conditional on being offered it. 
To identify the achievement gains from
the voucher program, we estimate a
series of education production functions.
Test scores in second and fourth grade
are regressed against a set of student and
school characteristics, including prior-
year test scores. The Terra Nova test is
applied: widely used across U.S.
schools, it measures basic skills across a
range of subjects. It is norm-referenced
to allow comparison between students.
The impacts of voucher status on
achievement are reported in table 1.
These impacts are effect-size gains rela-
tive to the public school comparison
group in reading, math, and language.
(“Effect sizes” are a statistical method
used to assess the magnitude of an effect.
In this and similar studies, an effect size
is the gain in achievement divided by the 
standard deviation of achievement; a 
gain of 0.1 is therefore one-tenth of a
standard deviation).
The top panel of table 1 shows mixed
effects according to voucher status. For
reading, there are no differences across
the four groups in second grade. For
math, voucher users report the lowest
scores. In contrast, for language, the 
public school group does considerably
worse than the other three groups; how-
ever, voucher users gain the least—both
nonusers and rejected applicants show
larger advantages. Given the biases that
might lead to statistically significant
gains for voucher users, we cannot find
evidence that voucher students outper-
form relevant comparison groups in 
second grade. Moreover, the bottom
panel shows that by fourth grade the
math penalty for voucher users persists,
but the gains in language have dissipated
to insignificance. 
Additional testing using second grade
data affirms the weakness of any
voucher effects. When we do not control
for prior achievement, the results do not
favor voucher users: The math penalty is
maintained, and the language advantage
over the public school group is elimi-
nated. Moreover, the rejected applicants
report statistically significant test score
gains in reading and language. When
we compare users only against those
who were not offered a voucher (the
treatment effect), users report scores
that are lower by 0.14 standard devia-
tion in reading and 0.11 standard devia-
tion in math, with no difference in lan-
guage. When we examine whether
those who have participated the longest
in the program obtain the strongest
effects, we find mixed effects across the
three subjects. 
Finally, we test for whether the impact
of vouchers differs by race. Restricting
the sample to black students, voucher
users appear more disadvantaged: Their
reading scores are now statistically sig-
nificant and lower; the math penalty is
now not statistically significant, but
remains negative; and the language
advantage is not discernible. These
subanalyses give no indication that
vouchers have a differential and benefi-
cial impact for black students. 
Overall, there is no clear advantage for
voucher students; if anything, there is 
a slight academic penalty. However,
given that in 2001 the value of the
voucher was less than $2,400, and the
opportunity cost in the public school
system was approximately $8,800, it
might be concluded that the voucher
program is cost-effective. Yet, back-of-
an-envelope calculations show that this
conclusion is premature. The CSP
voucher does not include transporta-
tion, which must be paid by the district
and which may be as high as $1,400
under a large-scale voucher program
with children going to many different
schools (see Levin and Driver, 1997),
and standardized assessments, which
public schools must impose. It does not
serve special education students or the
most disadvantaged students (who do
not make use of the voucher). And
because the program is subadditive, for
every three vouchers distributed
approximately one student would have
attended private school anyway. There
are also additional administrative costs.
Finally, the $8,800 figure for CMSD is
the average cost per student, not the
marginal cost. With approximate costs
of transportation, assessment, special
education, subadditivity, and adminis-
tration taken into account, the antici-
pated fiscal savings falls from $6,400
($8,800 – $2,400) to perhaps $2,500–
$3,000. Although this is still a sizeable
cost savings, it does not account for
TABLE 1: EFFECT-SIZE TEST SCORE GAINS OVER PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENTS
Reading Math Language
Second grade
Voucher user –0.060 –0.092 0.097
Nonuser –0.019 –0.021 0.162
Rejected applicant 0.083 0.026 0.136
Number of students 1,733 1,786 1,736
Fourth grade
Voucher user 0.042 –0.113 0.038
Nonuser –0.065 0.044 0.076
Rejected applicant –0.030 –0.055 –0.063





NOTES: 1. Terra Nova test. OLS estimation. Effect sizes control for: subject-specific first/third grade
scores; African American; Hispanic; female; free lunch (a proxy for income); unsubsidized lunch;
class size; years of teacher experience. 2. *significant at 10 percent; **significant at 5 percent; 
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marginal costs, student disadvantage, or
any reorganization costs. 
■ Conclusion
Recent research sheds light on the effi-
cacy of vouchers. Broadly, it may be
questioned whether vouchers—even
with some modest achievement gains—
will be a catalyst for educational
improvements. On the demand side,
there are many other factors influencing
the choices parents make. On the supply
side, most participating schools are reli-
gious, with little evidence of new secu-
lar schools opening or accepting vouch-
ers. Also, there is limited guidance on
what makes for an efficient private
school. Thus, competition between
schools will probably be muted, and
nonreligious students are unlikely to
have more options. Finally, general
equilibrium models explain why home-
owning voters are wary about expanding
voucher programs.
The Cleveland Scholarship program
readily fits into this general pattern,
evincing similar features to voucher 
programs in Milwaukee, Florida, and
Washington, D.C. Although targeted at
students from low-income families,
these programs in fact serve those some-
what closer to the middle of the income
distribution when usage rates and prior
schooling are accounted for. Students
are highly likely to be in religious
schools, and black students are less
likely to use their voucher. 
Importantly, the CSP results are not
encouraging with respect to achieve-
ment: The program shows a slight acad-
emic penalty for voucher users relative
to other comparison groups. Thus, it
seems unlikely that an expanded state-
wide program will radically enhance
educational outcomes in Ohio. 
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